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The first seven student-written Comments of the 59th volume of theÌýBoston College Law Review E. Supplement are now available. Comments will continue to be added to the ÌÇÐÄvlogÖ±²¥Æ½Ì¨LR E. Supp.Ìýon a rolling basis throughout the spring.

Summaries of the seven Comments may be found below. Full text versions can be found on the ÌÇÐÄvlogÖ±²¥Æ½Ì¨LR website:

Excessive Force, Police Dogs, and the Fourth Amendment in the Ninth Circuit: The Use of Summary Judgement inÌýLowry v. City of San DiegoÌýbyÌýNatasha Dobrott

In her Comment,ÌýExcessive Force, Police Dogs, and the Fourth Amendment in the Ninth Circuit: The Use of Summary Judgment inÌýLowry v. City of San Diego, Natasha Dobrott argues that the Ninth Circuit sittingÌýen bancÌýerred in affirming summary judgment in a San Diego excessive force case involving a police dog.ÌýDobrott argues that the fact-intensive objective reasonableness test applied in excessiveÌýforce cases should only be resolved through summary judgment on those rare occasions where the facts of the situation are not in dispute and the answer is clear as a matter of law.Ìý

The Department That Cried Wolf: Tenth Circuit Vacates Preliminary Injunction in Absence of Likely Injury inÌýNew Mexico Department of Game & Fish v. United States Department of the InteriorÌýbyÌýCurtis Cranston

In his Comment,ÌýThe Department That Cried Wolf: Tenth Circuit Vacates Preliminary Injunction in Absence of Likely Injury inÌýNew Mexico Department of Game & Fish v. United States Department of the Interior,ÌýCurtis Cranston argues thatÌýthe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth CircuitÌýproperly rejected sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests. The Tenth Circuit approach, Cranston argues, correctly treats preliminary injunctions as extraordinary remedies byÌýholding that moving parties must demonstrate, at a minimum, that all four factors of the traditional test are met and by specificallyÌýemphasizing likely irreparable injury as the most important prerequisite to preliminary relief.

If Technology is the Hare, Is Congress the Tortoise? Split Circuits in the Wake ofÌýDahdaÌýbyÌýMichael Koch

In his Comment,ÌýÌýIf Technology is the Hare, is Congress the Tortoise? Split Circuits in the Wake ofÌýDahda, Michael Koch argues that the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and Seventh Circuits have missed an important issue underlying case law in the wiretap and mobile communication interception space: outdated legislation that does not take into account modern technology. Koch argues that the focus should not be on the definition of "mobile interception device" withinÌýTitle III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, but on calling Congress to action in revising Title III to account for new, controversial interception devices.Ìý

Title VII Is Not the Only Cure for Employment Discrimination: The Implications ofÌýDoe v. Mercy Catholic Medical CenterÌýin Expanding Claims for Medical Residents Under Title IXÌýbyÌýAmy-Lee Goodman

In her Comment,ÌýTitle VII is Not The Only Cure for Employment Discrimination: The Implications ofÌýDoe v. Mercy Catholic Medical CenterÌýin Expanding Claims for Medical Residents UnderÌýTitle IX,ÌýAmy-Lee Goodman argues that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit properly allowed medical residents, who function as both students and as employees of a hospital, to bring private causes of action for gender discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Since successfully completing a medical residency program is a pre-requisite to practicing as a physician,Goodman argues that the Third Circuit’s decision furthers the goals of Title IX, which seeks to combat discrimination against minorities in education and, more specifically, advance the number of women in professional fields such as law and medicine.Ìý

Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna: The Sixth Circuit Frustrates Public Employees’ Right to a Jury TrialÌýbyÌýMargaux Joselow

In her Comment, Mayhew v. Town of Symrna:ÌýThe Sixth Circuit Frustrates Public Employees’ÌýRight to a Jury Trial, Margaux Joselow argues that by holding that the protected status of speechÌýremains a question of law for the court to decide, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit passed up an invaluableÌýopportunity—as a historically conservative court—to defend the voices of public employees. TheÌýSixth Circuit’s approach, Joselow argues, instead infringes on public employees’ right to a juryÌýtrial, which may leave much public-sector misconduct unreported as employees become hesitant toÌýreport misconduct at their jobs.

Praying for Clarity:ÌýLund,ÌýBormuth, and the Split Over Legislator-Led PrayerÌýbyÌýJohn Gavin

In his Comment,ÌýPraying for Clarity:ÌýLund,ÌýBormuth, and the Split Over Legislator-Led Prayer, John Gavin argues that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erroneously applied Supreme Court precedent and conducted an incomplete factual analysis when it held prayers delivered by the Jackson County Board of Commissioners constitutional inÌýBormuth v. County of Jackson. Gavin argues that the decision’s analysis pales in comparison to the Second Circuit’s application of the same precedent to a nearly identical factual situation inÌýLund v. Rowan County. The Second Circuit’s approach, Gavin argues, more faithfully follows the guidance of the Supreme Court, and thereby better protects the First Amendment right at stake.

Bankruptcy’s Exceptions to Discharge: When Does a Statement About a Single Asset Respect The Debtor’s Financial Condition?ÌýbyÌýRoman Ibragimov

In his Comment,ÌýBankruptcy's Exceptions to Discharge: When Does a Statement About a Single Asset Respect The Debtor's Financial Condition?, Roman Ibragimov argues that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit improperly applied Supreme Court case law to the Bankruptcy Code to hold that a statement about a single asset respects a debtor's financial condition. Ibragimov contends that by using the case to define "respecting" in one of the Bankruptcy Code's exceptions to discharge of debts, the Eleventh Circuit should not have omitted a crucial word from the case's definition in its application to the Bankruptcy Code. By doing so, the Eleventh Circuit misguidedly split with other circuits that have ruled on this issue.